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AN ANALYSIS OF THE ENHANCED RISK CAUSE OF ACTION
(OR HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND
LOVE TOXIC WASTE)
I. INTRODUCTION
In November, 1978, officials from Jackson Township, New Jersey
informed residents near the Legler landfill that their well water was no
longer safe.1 Various toxins from the landfill, which was owned and op-
erated by the township,2 had leached into the area ground water, con-
taminating the wells. 3 As a result, 339 nearby residents brought an
action against the township in Ayers v. Jackson Township,4 for decreased
quality of life, 5 mental distress, 6 and expenses for medical surveillance
incurred because of the exposure.7 While the residents did not claim
that they suffered any present physical injury, they claimed that they suf-
fered an enhanced risk of disease 8 and that this risk was presently
compensable.
Initially, the trial court granted the township's motion for summary
judgment on the enhanced risk claim.9 The court stated that since this
1. Ayers v.Jackson Township, 106 N.J. 557, 569, 525 A.2d 287, 293 (1987).
2. The township owned and operated the Legler landfill from 1972 until
1978. Id. at 567, 525 A.2d at 292.
3. Among the various chemicals found were: acetone, benzene, chloroben-
zene, chloroform, dichlorofluoromethene, ethylbenzene, methylene chloride,
methyl isobutyl ketone, 1,1,2,2-tetrachloroethane, tetrahydrofuran, 1,1,1-
trichloroethane and trichloroethylene. Id. at 568, 525 A.2d at 292. Four of the
chemicals are known carcinogens. Id. Other potential health hazards from the
chemicals include kidney, liver, blood, reproductive and neurological damage
and mutations in genetic material. Id.
4. 189 N.J. Super. 561, 461 A.2d 184 (Law Div. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 202 N.J. Super. 106, 493 A.2d 1314 (App. Div.), certification granted, 102
N.J. 306, 508 A.2d 191 (1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525
A.2d 287 (1987).
5. The Legler area residents were without running water from December,
1978. Ayers, 202 N.J. Super. at 116, 493 A.2d at 1319. The township then began
delivering water to the affected homes. Residents often had to haul water bar-
rels weighing 120 pounds in and out of their homes and up and down stairs.
Often the delivered water contained debris and had to be replaced. Id. at 116-
17, 493 A.2d at 1317. Running water service resumed in July, 1980. Id. at 112,
493 A.2d at 1317.
6. Residents based their emotional distress claims on the fear and anxiety
that resulted from the knowledge that they and members of their families had
been exposed to the contaminated water. Id. at 115, 493 A.2d at 1318-19.
7. Plaintiffs' expert witness testified that the residents required annual med-
ical examinations to detect possible diseases resulting from the exposure to the
toxins. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 568, 525 A.2d at 292.
8. Id. at 577, 525 A.2d at 297.
9. Ayers, 189 N.J. Super. at 568, 461 A.2d at 187-88.
(437)
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risk was not couched in terms of a reasonable probability, any damages
were, as a matter of law, too speculative.' 0 On the other claims, how-
ever, the jury returned a judgment of over $15,800,000 for the
plaintiffs. I I
The appellate division dismissed the jury awards for medical sur-
veillance and emotional distress and affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the enhanced risk claim.' 2 The appellate division held that the medi-
cal surveillance claim, like the enhanced risk claim, was too speculative
since the plaintiffs could not show that it was more likely than not that
the diseases would later materialize.' 3 The court also held that the New
Jersey Tort Claims Act,14 which limits the tort liability of public entities,
precluded the emotional distress claim. 15
The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged the legitimacy of the
residents' concerns, fears and anxiety about contracting disease as a re-
sult of their exposure to the toxins. Yet the court determined that the
claim for emotional distress was clearly barred by the Tort Claims Act,
and it affirmed the dismissal of that claim.' 6 However, the court upheld
10. The trial court found that, since the plaintiffs had no present physical
injury and could not quantify the risk that the exposure had caused them, there
could be no compensation for the possible future harm. Id. at 567-68, 461 A.2d
at 187.
11. The aggregate judgment was for $15,854,392.78, and the jury returned
an individual award to each plaintiff. The awards for each claim were as follows:
$2,056,480 for emotional distress; $5,396,940 for decreased quality of life; and
$8,204,500 for future medical expenses. Ayers, 106 NJ. at 565-66, 525 A.2d at
291.
12. Ayers, 202 N.J. Super. at 116, 122, 125-26, 493 A.2d at 1319, 1323-24.
13. Id. at 120-23, 493 A.2d at 132-23. The court noted that the plaintiffs'
medical expert had testified that all the residents had a significantly enhanced
risk of disease, but that he could not quantify it. Id. at 125-26, 493 A.2d at 1324.
The court found that this fact, and the fact that none of the plaintiffs had suf-
fered physical harm, made the medical surveillance claim an unfair "burden" on
the township. Id. at 122, 493 A.2d at 1323.
14. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1-59:12-3 (West 1987).
15. Ayers, 202 N.J. Super. at 115-16, 493 A.2d at 1318-19. The pertinent
portion of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act is as follows:
No damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public em-
ployee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury; provided, how-
ever, that this limitation of damages on the recovery for pain and
suffering shall not apply in cases of permanent loss of bodily function,
disfigurement, or permanent dismemberment where the medical treat-
ment expenses are in excess of $1,000.00 ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2(d) (West 1987).
The appellate division stated that the emotional distress claim constituted
pain and suffering as defined in the Act. Therefore, as there was no accompany-
ing injury, the claim was barred. Ayers, 202 N.J. Super. at 116, 493 A.2d at 1319.
16. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 577, 525 A.2d at 297. The court stated that emotional
distress was as much an injury as "a broken limb." Id. It also found that in this
case, the emotional distress was understandable and very real. Id. However, the
court found that the subjective symptoms that constituted such emotional dis-
tress (e.g., depression, fear, anxiety and the like) were "pain and suffering" as
contemplated by the Tort Claims Act. Therefore, the court held that such a
438 [Vol. 33: p. 437
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the residents' claim for medical surveillance. 17 Furthermore, it affirmed
the appellate division's dismissal of the enhanced risk claim.' 8 The
court refused to recognize a cause of action for enhanced risk where that
risk was unquantified, although it left open the question of whether such
a risk would be compensable if the injury was reasonably probable. 19
Yet the supreme court agreed with the trial court in holding that neither
the statute of limitations nor New Jersey's single controversy rule 20
would prevent the plaintiffs from recovering for physical injuries that
later developed. 2 '
claim for emotional distress against a governmental entity was clearly barred by
the Act. Id.
For a further discussion of a claim for emotional distress in a toxic exposure
context, see infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
17. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 606, 525 A.2d at 312. For a further discussion of a
claim for medical surveillance, see infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
18. Ayers, 106 NJ. at 598-99, 525 A.2d at 308. For a further discussion of
the claim for enhanced risk, see infra notes 114-29 & 140-50 and accompanying
text.
19. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 598-99, 525 A.2d at 308. Since plaintiffs' medical ex-
pert could not or would not quantify the risk the residents suffered, Ayers, 202
N.J. Super. at 125-26, 493 A.2d at 1324, the court found it unnecessary to decide
whether a quantified or "reasonably probable" risk might be actionable. Ayers,
106 N.J. at 398-99, 525 A.2d at 308. The NewJersey Supreme Court had previ-
ously refused to address this issue. See Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 406, 471
A.2d 405, 409 (1984). In Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.
1986), the Third Circuit, applying New Jersey law, predicted that New Jersey
would reject the enhanced risk cause of action. Id. at 81-83. The court stated
that the claim is "fundamentally at odds with New Jersey's approach to compen-
sable injury," since the plaintiff sought compensation for future injury without
demonstrating that the injury was reasonably probable. Id. at 82. In addition,
the Third Circuit held that "NewJersey recognizes the cost of preventative mon-
itoring occasioned by a tort as an independent element of damages." Id. at 83.
Thus, the court allowed recovery for medical surveillance. Id. Furthermore, the
court held that emotional distress caused by fear of future disease was compen-
sable. Id. at 85. The Herber court was not faced with the issue of governmental
tort immunity that was present in Ayers. Therefore, it seems the Third Circuit
made a fairly prescient prediction of how the New Jersey high court would react
to an enhanced risk claim.
20. The single controversy rule is New Jersey's version of the prohibition
against claim splitting, resjudicata. This rule requires that a party include in an
action all related claims against an adversary, and its failure to do so precludes
the maintenance of a second action based on that related claim. Aetna Ins. Co.
v. Gilchrist Bros. Inc., 85 N.J. 550, 556-57, 428 A.2d 1254, 1257 (1981). The
single controversy rule is somewhat broader than traditional resjudicata, which
prohibits parties from splitting a cause of action into different suits. The single
controversy rule forces a party to bring all related claims together, whether or
not they constitute one cause of action. Melikian v. Corradetti, 791 F.2d 274,
279 (3d Cir. 1986).
21. The trial court stated that "[i]f and when a plaintiff manifests a physical
condition which could be medically attributable to the ingestion of the alleged
contaminants, his cause of action will have survived" by virtue of New Jersey's
discovery rule. Ayers, 189 N.J. Super. at 568, 461 A.2d at 187-88. The appellate
division characterized this as "dictum only." Ayers, 202 N.J. Super. at 125, 493
A.2d at 1324. Subsequently, the supreme court concurred with the trial court's
19881 NOTE 439
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The situation that the residents of Jackson Township found them-
selves in is, unfortunately, not unique. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has estimated that there may be as many as 50,000 toxic
waste sites in the United States.22 Any manifestation of disease due to
exposure to these chemicals may take place years after the exposure it-
self.23 Consequently, an exposure victim may be aware of his or her
peril years before he or she suffers any physical harm.
Moreover, there is an abundance of other toxins24 which may lend
themselves to an enhanced risk claim.2 5 Many of the people who have
been exposed to these toxins have not yet suffered any injuries as a re-
sult. If these potential victims wait to bring their claims, they may face
determination that the plaintiffs' cause of action would not be barred if latent
injury does in fact occur. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 584, 525 A.2d at 300.
22. INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM Toxic WASTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVE-
MENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES, A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION
301(e) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE COMPENSATION AND
LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (P.L. 96-5 10) BY THE "SUPERFUND SECTION 301 (e) STUDY
GROUP" pts I & II Comm. Print for the Senate Comm. on Envtl. & Pub. Works
No. 97-12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., app. A at 2 (1982), [hereinafter SUPERFUND
STUDY GROUP]. "Estimates of the number of sites that contain hazardous waste
range from 50,000 to 4,082. Corresponding estimates of the number of sites
that may pose a serious health risk range from 2,000 to 431." Id. These discrep-
ancies indicate that the true nature and extent of the toxic waste problem are
unknown. Id.
23. The Ayers court noted that the "long latency period typical of illness
caused by chemical pollutants" is one of the primary reasons that the tort system
has difficulty in handling toxin exposure suits. Ayers, 106 NJ. at 582, 525 A.2d at
299.
24. As used in this Note, the word "toxin" refers to any substance that has
deleterious effects on the human body, and the phrase "toxic tort" refers to any
injury resulting from exposure to such a substance. See M. DORE, LAW OF Toxic
TORTS at § 2.02 (listing 10 basic characteristics of toxic torts, two of which being
exposure to harmful substance and diseases with long latency periods). The
term toxic tort can be used in a wide range of situations, from traditional torts
such as negligence to products liability to environmental law. Id. at § 2.01-.02.
25. These toxins include asbestos (see Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984), on rehk'g en banc, 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir.),
question certified en banc, 757 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1985), certification declined en banc,
781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986)), agent orange (see In
re Agent Orange Product Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd,
818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987)); diethylstilbestrol (DES) (see Sindell v. Abbott Lab-
oratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980)); and radioactive waste (see Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247
(D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 694
(1988)). Asbestos alone is a staggering problem. Studies have estimated that
over 21,000,000 Americans have been exposed to significant amounts of asbes-
tos. Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1337 (citingJ. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER, G.
HAGGSTROM & M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION 9 (1984)) [hereinaf-
ter ASBESTOS LITIGATION]. Over 20,000 personal injury suits have been filed for
asbestos-related injuries. Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1336 n.24 (citing ASBESTOS LITI-
GATION, supra, at 12). By the year 2000, 200,000 people are expected to die due
to exposure to asbestos. Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1337 (citing ASBESTOS LITIGATION,
supra, at 9).
440 [Vol. 33: p. 437
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many barriers to recovery. 26 The New Jersey Supreme Court specifi-
cally recognized this problem and addressed a resulting issue: "[A]t
what stage in the evolution of a toxic injury should tort law intercede by
requiring the responsible party to pay damages?"2 7 While the court re-
jected enhanced risk as a cause of action, it did provide a framework
such that those who actually suffer injury in the future may recover.
II. BACKGROUND
The various toxins produced by a modern industrialized society cre-
ate problems for the common law tort system beyond the tremendous
number of law suits that may result from exposure to such toxins. 28
Many courts and commentators have asserted that the current tort sys-
tem is ill-suited to toxic torts. 29 Critics see the current tort system as
"too cumbersome, costly, and haphazard to accomplish its accident pre-
vention and compensation objectives." 3 0 The types of injuries suffered
by today's toxin exposure victims are unlike those contemplated by the
courts that created traditional tort rights, remedies, duties, and doc-
trines.3 1 The burdens created by applying common law tort rules to the
26. For a discussion of the barriers to recovery, see infra notes 32-113 and
accompanying text.
27. Ayers, 106 NJ. at 579, 525 A.2d at 298.
28. For a discussion of the number of toxins that have the potential to cause
toxic torts and the massive number of suits that have arisen from asbestos alone,
see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
29. See StJPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 22, pt. II, apps. A-J at 1-262
(extensive critique of existing remedies for damages due to exposure to hazard-
ous waste); Seltzer, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal for Tort
Reform, 10 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 797, 852 (1982-83) (courts are "an inacces-
sible forum for relief" for toxin exposure victims due to inability of legal system
to adapt to such cases); Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts:" Relieving
Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
177, 188-89 (1983) (toxin exposure victims must rely on common law theories
for recovery and such theories are not suited to legal and practical characteris-
tics of toxic torts); Comment, Increased Risk of Disease from Hazardous Waste: A
Proposal for Judicial Relief, 60 WASH. L. REV. 635, 636-37 (1985) [hereinafter Com-
ment, Increased Risk of Disease] (postponing recovery for toxin exposure victims
until manifestation of disease is inequitable); Note, Statutes of Limitations and Pol-
lutant Injuries: The Need for a Contemporary Legal Response to Contemporary Technologi-
cal Failure, 9 HOrSTRA L. REV. 1525, 1530-31 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Statutes of
Limitation] (traditional application of statutes of limitation "may foreclose plain-
tiff from recovery" for toxin-related injuries). See also Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1335
(Rubin, J., dissenting) ("asbestos-related litigation presents a flood of interre-
lated actions which cannot properly be decided as individual actions or under
the legal rules of any single state"); Ayers, 106 NJ. at 581, 525 A.2d at 299 ("The
overwhelming conclusion of the commentators" who have considered how tort
system has adapted to toxic torts is that system has not reacted effectively to
problem.).
30. Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 854 (1984).
31. Id. at 852-53 (listing some characteristics of modem toxin exposure
cases that differentiate them from traditional torts).
19881 NOTE
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toxic tort context are, more often than not, burdens that the toxin expo-
sure victim must bear.
A. The Obstacles to Recovery
Proving causation is one of the main impediments to recovery. 3 2
While this is rarely a problem in the average tort suit, 3 3 for many rea-
sons, proving causation in a toxic tort suit may be a formidable task.
The extended latency period of the diseases that result from toxins
is the primary reason for the difficulties that plaintiffs encounter in prov-
ing causation.3 4 The plaintiff must prove years after exposure that he or
she contracted cancer due to exposure to the defendant's toxin. The
victim must also show that no intervening causes resulted in the devel-
opment of the disease.3 5 The intervening cause argument may pose
particular difficulties for a plaintiff who smokes or lives in a particularly
polluted area.3 6
Indeed, the problems that the toxic tort plaintiff encounters in
proving causation may be as basic as the definition of "cause" itself,
32. See Ayers, 106 N.J. at 585, 525 A.2d 301 (court saw causation as most
difficult problem facing toxic tort plaintiffs). See generally Rosenberg, supra note
30, at 855-59 ("Under either a negligence or strict liability standard, mass expo-
sure claimants ... must establish ... a 'causal connection' between the defend-
ant's tortious conduct and the losses for which recovery is sought." This burden
of proof becomes increasingly difficult to meet when there are alternative possi-
ble sources of plaintiff's injury.); Seltzer, supra note 29, at 809-15 ("[by] the very
nature of hazardous waste pollution-related diseases ... the causal links in the
chain between exposure and injury are seriously attenuated").
33. One court has characterized the general causal connection between the
defendant's action and the plaintiff's injury as follows: "Often, the cause-and-
effect is obvious: A's vehicle strikes B, injuring him; a bottle of A's product ex-
plodes, injuring B; water impounded on A's property flows onto B's land, caus-
ing immediate damage." Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 405 (D. Utah
1984), (dealing with relationship between radiation exposure and human can-
cer), rev'd 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 694 (1988). The
Allen court went on to explain the difficulties facing plaintiffs in toxin exposure
suits and recommended allowing statistical evidence to help resolve the causa-
tion issue. 588 F. Supp. at 419.
34. See Ayers, 106 N.J. at 585, 525 A.2d at 301 ("[T]he task of proving causa-
tion is invariably made more complex because of the long latency period of ill-
nesses caused by carcinogens or other toxic chemicals.").
35. Id. The Ayers court noted that diseases suffered by exposure victims are
often not unique to those who come in contact with the toxins in question.
Therefore, plaintiffs must show that no other causes prompted disease. Id.
36. See, e.g., Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 466-67 (5th Cir.
1985); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1139 (5th Cir.
1985). In Dartez, the court refused to allow a plaintiff with asbestosis to recover
for an increased risk of cancer. Dartez, 765 F.2d at 467. The court found it
significant that the plaintiff smoked, as there was evidence indicating that if he
had stopped smoking, his risk of cancer would have been reduced by one-third.
Id. at 466-67. In Gideon, the plaintiff also smoked, but he was allowed to recover
despite the defendant's contention that smoking caused his disease. Gideon, 761
F.2d at 1139.
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since the medical definition of cause differs from the legal definition.3 7
While scientific cause refers to a general propensity of a given substance
to cause harm, legal cause assumes that the harm has in fact occurred
and refers to the issue of what has prompted it.3 8 Consequently, when a
physician testifies as to the effects of a toxin, his or her use of the word
"cause" may obfuscate rather than clarify the nature of the chemical and
the legal consequences of exposure to it.
Moreover, toxic exposure may begin, last for a period of years, and
then end without the victim ever knowing that exposure took place. Af-
ter exposure ends, victims have difficulty showing precisely what toxins
they were exposed to, as well as the extent and duration of the exposure.
In the period between the exposure to the toxin and development of
disease, much of the evidence of causation may be lost. 3 9 Records may
be destroyed. Over time, toxins may combine with other elements in
the environment or waste sites in which they are stored.40 Toxicolo-
gists4 ' may therefore be unable to discern exactly what constituted a
37. What scientists mean when they say that a substance "causes" a disease
is that a certain number of people exposed to that substance will contract the
disease. Trauberman, supra note 29, at 198. Not everyone, often not even a
majority of those who are exposed, will get the disease, no matter how deadly
the toxin is. Seltzer, supra note 29, at 810. Legal cause demands a more direct
connection between the conduct of an individual and its consequences before
liability can be imposed. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 263 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER
AND KEETON] ("An essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action ... is that
there be some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defend-
ant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered.").
38. A trial court noted the distinction between medical and legal cause in
Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (D. Ga. 1985), modified as
to damages, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 437 (1986). In that
case a mother and her daughter sued for injuries allegedly caused by the
mother's use of the defendant's spermicide. The daughter was born horribly
disabled. Id. at 267. In assessing the medical testimony after a bench trial, the
court stated that
the plaintiffs' ultimate burden was not to produce an unassailable scien-
tific study which proves that spermicides have caused birth defects in
rats, rabbits or members of a large group health plan, but rather to
show from all the evidence presented, to a reasonable degree of medi-
cal certainty, that the spermicide caused some or all of Katie Wells' [the
plaintiff daughter] birth defects.
Id. at 266 (emphasis in original).
Thus, the court distinguished between medical causation concepts and the
specific evidence required by tort law.
39. Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Rem-
edy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 925 (1981) (lack of records due to passage o time
and deliberate practices of waste disposers may hinder recovery).
40. Id. at 922 (chemicals may combine with other substances and/or change
characteristics upon release into environment); Soble, A Proposal for the Adminis-
trative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution: A Model Act, 14 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 683, 707 (1977) (noting difficulties in using technical and scientific
data in exposure cases, including synergistic effects of chemical substances).
41. Toxicologists study "the science dealing with the effects, antidotes, de-
7
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given exposure.
Causation is not the only difficulty facing the toxic tort plaintiff.
Toxic waste sites often change hands several times between their first
use and the discovery of exposure. Ownership of the plants and manu-
facturing facilities that produce toxic waste often changes over what can
be the long period between exposure and development of disease.
Plaintiffs may, therefore, find it extremely difficult to show which owner
was responsible for their injuries. 4 2
The statute of limitations may pose further difficulties for plain-
tiffs.4 3 The general rule is that a cause of action accrues at the time of
the tortfeasor's tortious act or omission. 44 With the advent of industri-
alized society and toxins which cause latent diseases, this rule began to
work great hardship on plaintiffs. 4 5 As a result, most jurisdictions have
adopted a version of the "discovery rule" under which the statute of
limitations begins to run after manifestation of the disease. 46 In states
tection, etc., of poisons." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1500 (1966).
42. See SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 22, app. C, at 80 (problems in
toxic tort litigation are compounded by multiplicity of parties in both produc-
tion and disposal of hazardous waste); Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 39 at 927
(despite number of parties on which liability may attach, plaintiffs often cannot
find solvent, responsible parties from which to recover damages).
43. See Note, Statutes of Limitations, supra note 29, at 1527 (statutes of limita-
tion "may pose significant and sometimes insurmountable obstacles to recovery
in hazardous- and toxic-waste-disposal cases where private parties seek compen-
sation for latent or progressive personal injuries.").
44. SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 22, app. B, at 15. This rule was
developed at a time when the tortious act and injury were generally simultane-
ous. Id.
45. The United States Supreme Court noted that the statute of limitations
could work an injustice in toxic injury cases as early as 1949 in Urie v. Thomp-
son, 337 U.S. 163 (1949). In that case, the Court noted that if the statute of
limitations was held to begin at exposure, the law could provide only a "delusive
remedy" to exposure victims. Id. at 169.
46. There are several versions of the discovery rule. Under the most com-
mon, the statute begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
his or her disease. Id. at 170; Krug v. Sterling Drug, 416 S.W.2d 143, 150 (Mo.
1967). See generally 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitations of Actions § 137, at 707-08 (since
disease may go undiscovered for long time, statute begins to run at time of man-
ifestation of disease, or when its existence was or should have been discovered);
Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1176, 1203-05
(1950) (exception to general rule that knowledge of injury is irrelevant is desira-
ble when plaintiff is unlikely to learn of injury before statute has expired). New
Jersey has a somewhat more liberal version of the discovery rule. In NewJersey,
the statute runs from the time the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
disease and of the facts indicating there was a cause of action. Ayers, 106 NJ. at
582, 525 A.2d at 299-300.
For a comprehensive summary of the statutes of limitation of all the states,
see 1A F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 4A.03, at 150.1-152 (1987).
In addition, a recent amendment to the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1695-96
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without a discovery rule, victims whose symptoms manifest themselves
many years after exposure to toxins are left without a remedy. The stat-
ute of limitations may run before a vast majority of exposure victims
suffers any injury. 4 7
The possibility that a defendant may become insolvent is another
difficulty facing toxic tort plaintiffs. 48 When the Johns-Manville Corpo-
ration filed for bankruptcy in 1982, 4 9 its claim of insolvency was based
wholly on the fact that it faced over 15,000 plaintiffs in asbestos-related
litigation nationwide. 50 A defendant filing for bankruptcy may not pre-
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9658 (West Supp. 1987)), has ameliorated the prob-
lem somewhat. CERCLA now mandates that the states apply the Act's discovery
rule provisions in actions for personal injuries resulting from toxic waste expo-
sure. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9658. See Ayers, 106 N.J. at 582-83, 525 A.2d at 300 (CER-
CLA now pre-empts state statutes of limitations providing for minimum
commencement date as "date plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known)
that the ... injury... or damages were caused or contributed to by the hazard-
ous substance concerned"). Under the CERCLA discovery rule, the statute of
limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
injury. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9658.
Yet, CERCLA regulates "hazardous substances" which are defined as "such
elements, compounds, mixtures, solutions, and substances which, when released
into the environment may present substantial danger to the public health or wel-
fare or the environment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9602. Thus, CERCLA deals with toxic
wastes, not the consumer products and other goods that also may cause toxic
torts. For a discussion of the wide scope of the term "toxic tort," see supra note
24.
47. New York provides a good case in point. As late as 1981, the New York
Court of Appeals had refused to depart from its longstanding "last injurious
exposure" rule. Steinhardt v.Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1010, 446
N.Y.S.2d 244, 246, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 1299 (1981), cert. denied and appeal dismissed,
456 U.S. 967 (1982). Under this rule, the statute of limitations begins to run at
the date of the last exposure to the harmful substance. Id. The court took the
position that a change in the statute of limitations was a matter for the legisla-
ture, not the courts. Id. at 1010-11, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 246, 430 N.E.2d at 1299.
The court of appeals had maintained this position since 1936. Schmidt v.
Merchant's Dispatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 301-02, 200 N.E.2d 824, 827-
28 (1936). Until the legislature acted, federal courts had attempted to circum-
vent the rule or use it to the plaintiffs' advantage. See Ward v. Desachem Co.,
771 F.2d 663, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1985) (plaintiff who had discovered injury three
and one-half years before filing suit was not barred by three year statute of limi-
tations because he had been exposed to injurious substance after discovery of
injury). The New York legislature had previously made an exception to the last
injurious exposure rule solely for agent orange victims. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R.
§ 214-b (McKinney 1987). However, as late as 1985, most toxin exposure vic-
tims were virtually without a remedy in New York. In 1986, the New York legis-
lature finally adopted a discovery rule. 1986 N.Y. Laws ch. 682 § 2 (codified at
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-c (McKinney 1987)).
48. See Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11
Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1983) (bankruptcy causes immense problems
for "mass tort" plaintiffs; some such bankruptcy claims should be dismissed as
being in bad faith).
49. In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82 B 11,656 - 82 B 11,676 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 26, 1982).
50. See In reJohns-Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litig. Group, 26 Bankr. 420,
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vent eventual recovery by exposure victims. Yet, it will almost surely
lengthen already protracted lawsuits and perhaps reduce awards. 5 1
The doctrine ofresjudicata 52 may also prevent recovery. The typical
toxin exposure victim may already have suffered some injury in the form
of physical harm or property damage. 53 If the victim brings suit imme-
diately, resjudicata may require that he or she recover in one action dam-
ages for all injuries that have already occurred or may occur in the
future. 54 However, at that point, the victim may not have suffered other
serious consequences of the exposure, and any future damages may be
too speculative for recovery. Nonetheless, courts have held that resjudi-
cata bars a subsequent suit to recover for injuries resulting from expo-
sure to the toxic substance. 55 On the other hand, if the victim waits
422 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 40 Bankr. 219 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and
remanded, 41 Bankr. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Johns-Manville claimed that its asbes-
tos-related liability would exceed $2,000,000,000 by the year 2000. 26 Bankr. at
422.
51. Id. at 421-22. This action was for a stay of various asbestos-related liti-
gation. Id.
52. Generally, resjudicata is called the rule against claim splitting and is de-
fined as follows:
[A] valid, final judgment on the merits is a bar to a subsequent action
between the parties, or those in privity with them upon the same claim
or demand .... Such a judgment precludes the subsequent litigation
both of the issues actually decided in determining the claim asserted in
the first action and of issues that could have been raised in the adjudica-
tion of that claim.
NLRB v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir. 1983).
53. The Legler area residents did not claim any present physical injury be-
yond their enhanced risk of cancer. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 577, 525 A.2d at 297. Yet
they did claim that the township's negligence had interfered with their property
rights. Id. at 570, 525 A.2d at 293.
54. See Comment, Increased Risk of Disease, supra note 29, at 636-37 n.9
(courts may assert that exposure to toxic waste creates one cause of action and
therefore all damages must be recovered in that one action).
55. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986)
"The victim of exposure to toxic substances which cause present harm and
which may at some future time cause cancer or other serious disease is further
victimized by the single cause of action rule." Id. at 320. Hagerty was doused
twice with carcinogenic chemicals. He suffered some mild effects immediately,
but was forced to recover in his first suit for all physical injuries he might later
suffer. Id.
See also Carbonaro v. Johns-Manville Corp., 526 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa.
1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1982). In Carbonaro, the plaintiff suedJohns-
Manville for asbestos-related injuries in state court and lost. 526 F. Supp. at
261. After he later contracted colon cancer, he instituted an action in federal
court. Id. The district court concluded that, under Pennsylvania law, both the
state and federal actions were based on the same claim, and therefore, resjudicata
precluded the second action. Id. at 264. Cf. Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 427 Mich. 301, 399 N.W.2d 1 (1986). Although the Larson court concen-
trated on when a cause of action accrued for statute of limitations purposes, the
court also implicitly considered the res judicata issue. The court stated that
"plaintiffs who develop cancer which may be related to asbestos exposure, and
who have not brought an earlier action for asbestosis" may recover for the can-
446
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until the future consequences manifest themselves, the statute of limita-
tions may have run, notwithstanding the discovery rule.5 6 This dilemma
can be a serious one for some toxic tort plaintiffs, 57 as it may effectively
prevent full recovery.
Some courts have stated that policy considerations warrant the sus-
pension ofresjudicata in toxic tort cases. 5 8 The basic policies behind res
judicata include the need for finality of actions and the desire to promote
judicial economy.5 9 Courts have noted the unfairness of the rule and
cer provided that they sue within the statute of limitations. Larson, 427 Mich. at
319, 399 N.W.2d at 9. This begins to run, the court said, upon the discovery of
the cancer. Id. Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court impliedly held that resjudi-
cata would bar a subsequent suit for cancer where the plaintiff had previously
sued to recover for asbestosis. See also Johnson v. Armstrong Cork Co., 645 F.
Supp. 764, 769 (W.D. La. 1986) ("the single cause of action rule bars a plaintiff
from filing a second suit to recover for future complications arising out of a
single injury" and must be applied in asbestos cases despite the inequity it
works); Page v. Illinois Central Gulf R. R., 162 Ill. App. 3d 744, 744, 516 N.E.2d
431, 433 (Ill. App. 1987) (plaintiff's claim for aggravation of injuries from expo-
sure to toxic fumes at work was dismissed as plaintiff had previously recovered
damages from exposure and no new exposure was alleged). But see In re Moore-
novich, 634 F. Supp. 634, 637 (D. Me. 1986) (emotional distress claim due to
asbestos exposure was allowed absent injury; court stated that later action for
disease itself should not be barred by resjudicata); Parris v. Appalachian Power
Co., 2 Va. App. 219, 343 S.E.2d 455 (1986) (plaintiff's second workmen's com-
pensation claim for asbestos related injuries, brought two years after first such
claim, was allowed, despite fact that first had been denied, since second claim
was based on new medical evidence).
56. Hagerty v. L & L Marine 'Servs., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986). The
discovery rule permits the victim to wait until the injury manifests itself. Once
any injury appears, the victim's cause of action accrues and the statute of limita-
tions may begin to run on all claims resulting from the tortious conduct. Id. But
see Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 427 Mich. 301, 319, 399 N.W.2d 1, 9
(recovery for cancer caused by asbestos exposure was allowed if suit was
brought within three years of discovery of cancer, provided no previous action
for effects of asbestos exposure had been brought).
57. For a thorough discussion of the problems that res judicata may cause
toxic tort plaintiffs, see Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986). See also Hagerty
v. L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315 320-21 (5th Cir. 1986); Jackson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 516-22 (5th Cir. 1984), on reh'gen banc, 750
F.2d 1314 (5th Cir.), question certified, 757 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.), certification declined
en banc, 469 So. 2d 99 (Miss.), aff'd en banc, 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986). These cases note the problems concerning the
doctrine of resjudicata in toxic tort litigation and the viability of the doctrine in
that context.
58. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 320-21 (5th Cir.
1986); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 516-22 (5th Cir.
1984), on reh'g en banc, 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir.), question certified, 757 F.2d 614
(5th Cir.), certification declined en banc, 469 So. 2d 99 (Miss.), af'd en banc, 781 F.2d
394 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986); Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc.
v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521-23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 492 So.
2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
59. For a discussion of the policies promoted by resjudicata, see infra note
63 and accompanying text.
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the hardship it works on toxin exposure victims. 60 One Florida court, in
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Cox,6 1 "balanc[ed] the need for finality
against countervailing factors which militate in favor of the splitting of
the actions."' 62 The court found that while the rule against claim split-
ting is founded on very real and legitimate policy goals, 63 it "is not an
absolute [bar] and that the procedural rule against splitting causes of
action must be relaxed when equitable considerations demand it."'64
Therefore, the court held, in rejecting an enhanced risk claim, that res
judicata will not bar a subsequent suit if the plaintiff later develops can-
cer. 65 The court asserted that because the second action was no longer
barred, the rationale for enhanced risk vanished. 66 Other courts have
agreed with the reasoning in Eagle-Picher, but were nevertheless reluc-
tant to modify res judicata, as they stated they lacked the authority to
make such a change. 67
Moreover, toxic tort litigation is generally extremely expensive and
60. For a discussion of the hardships created by resjudicata and the response
to it in toxic tort cases, see supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
61. 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331
(Fla. 1986). In Eagle-Picher, the plaintiff received a substantial money judgment
at trial for asbestosis, fear of contracting cancer, and enhanced risk of con-
tracting cancer. Id. at 519.
62. Id. at 521.
63. "The rule is founded on the sound policy reason that the finality estab-
lished by the rule promotes greater stability in the law, avoids vexatious and
multiple lawsuits arising out of a single tort incident, and is consistent with the
absolute necessity of bringing litigation to an end." Id. at 520 (citing McKibben
v. Zamora, 358 So. 2d 866, 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
64. Id. at 521. Indeed, the Eagle-Picher court asserted that if it allowed claim
splitting in asbestos cases, litigation would decrease in volume. Many victims,
the court stated, would not seek damages for asbestosis alone if they could re-
cover later for the disastrous effects of cancer. Id. at 522-23.
65. Id. at 520. The court stated that:
[i]n deciding, as we do, that the plaintiff cannot recover damages in the
present case for his enhanced risk of contracting cancer in the future
...we also decide an issue not squarely before us, that is, that the




67. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 320 (5th Cir.
1986) (noting res judicata problems in toxic tort litigation and recommending
that Fifth Circuit adopt such rule "when the proper case is presented"); Gideon
v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying
resjudicata under Texas law in asbestos case without regard to consequences to
plaintiff); Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Colo. 1984)
(court was reluctant to grant motion for partial summary judgment on claim for
enhanced risk as plaintiffs will not be able to bring second action if and when
injuries become manifest); Carbonaro v. Johns-Manville Corp., 526 F. Supp.
260, 264 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (although court was sympathetic towards cancer victim,
judge found it was his "duty, however, to decide cases without sympathy, by
references to the appropriate legal principles," and under principles ofresjudi-
cata, claim was barred), aff'd, 688 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1982).
448 [Vol. 33: p. 437
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time consuming, 6 8 making the temptation for premature settlement
high. 6 9 Therefore, one of the most effective tools for the plaintiff is the
class action suit. 70 Yet, significant differences in liability, defenses to
liability, and damages may exist in any given toxin exposure case. 7 1 As a
result, class certification is often difficult for plaintiffs to obtain.7 2
In response to these and other problems facing the toxic tort plain-
tiff,73 commentators have advanced the notion of the enhanced risk
cause of action.74 Meanwhile, federal response to the problem has been
68. It has been estimated that for every dollar received by plaintiffs in as-
bestos cases, a total of $2.71 is spent on litigation expenses. J. KAKALIK, P.
EBENER, H. FELSTINER, & M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION 40 (1983).
In Ayers, for example, more than 150 plaintiffs testified as to their damages.
Ayers, 106 NJ. at 568, 525 A.2d at 292. The plaintiffs had to call as experts a
toxicologist, a groundwater expert, a diagnostician, and psychologists. Id.
Moreover, while the exposure was discovered in late 1978, the plaintiffs did not
obtain a final judgment against the township until mid-1987. For a discussion of
the history of the Ayers case, see supra notes 1-21 and accompanying text.
69. See Soble, supra note 40, at 712-14 (exposure victims susceptible to un-
fairly low settlements because of expense and difficulty in proving liability and
because victims often have existing medical expenses).
70. See generally SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 22, app. N, at 341-95;
Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV. L. REV.
1143, 1144-46 (1983). The Class Certification article noted that separate litigation
of claims from one tort incident entails enormous waste. Note, supra, at 1144.
Using the class action would allow for a reduction in per-plaintiff expenses. Id.
71. SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 22, app. N, at 343.
72. See M. DORE, supra note 24, at § 18.05 (vast majority of toxic tort cases
have declined class certification).
73. One of the most significant of these problems is proving negligence.
SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 22, app. K, at 264; Ayers, 106 N.J. at 584,
525 A.2d at 300. New Jersey has imposed strict liability for injuries caused by
the storage of toxic waste, stating that this practice is an ultrahazardous activity.
State Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 488-93, 468 A.2d
150, 157-60 (1983). Therefore, in New Jersey, plaintiffs avoid many of the
problems that may result if they were required to prove negligence. Yet, sover-
eign immunity can be a problem for toxin exposure victims. Many states have
statutes limiting state and municipal liability. See, e.g., Ayers, 106 N.J. at 570, 525
A.2d at 293; see also SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 22, app. 0, at 402-05
(state by state rundown of sovereign immunity statutes). The New Jersey Tort
Claims Act specifically precludes any claim against a public entity in strict liabil-
ity. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2(b) (West 1982). Therefore, while private compa-
nies can be held strictly liable in New Jersey, public entities cannot. See Kenny v.
Scientific Inc., 204 N.J. Super. 228, 497 A.2d 1310 (Law Div. 1985).
74. See Gale & Goyer, Recover for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of Cancer, 15
CUMB. L. REV. 723, 741-44 (1985) (evidence of enhanced risk is no more unrelia-
ble than other subjective forms of evidence; rejection of such evidence leads to
undercompensation of plaintiffs). See Seltzer, supra note 29, at 833 (recognition
of inherent unfairness of traditional common-law remedies has led many courts
away from strict adherence to " 'highly probable' test of determining the sub-
stantiality of at-risk injury claims"); Comment, Increased Risk of Disease, supra note
29, at 643-52 (recognition of increased risk of disease cause of action "provides
important practical benefits and is supported by analogous tort principles");
Note, Increased Risk of Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18 GA. L. REV. 563, 592 (1984)
[hereinafter Note, Increased Risk of Cancer] (enhanced or "non-traditional" tort
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slow, despite the urging of several courts. 7 5 In 1976, Congress passed
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),7 6 which dealt
with the regulation of waste disposal. 77 Passed amid much publicity in
1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA), known as the "Superfund" legislation, is an at-
tempt to hold the disposers of toxic wastes financially responsible for
any cleanup needed at the disposers' sites. 7 8 Neither RCRA nor CER-
CLA, however, provided for personal injury recovery. 79
risk is worthy of compensation); Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Princi-
ples to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation,
35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 607-16 (1983) (burden of risk should be placed on actor
rather than innocent party who is subjected to risk).
75. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 415 (5th
Cir.) ("Congress' silence in the face of a desparate [sic] need for federal legisla-
tion in the field of asbestos litigation does not authorize the federal judiciary to
assume for itself the responsibility for formulating what are essentially legislative
solutions"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1146 (5th Cir. 1985) ("traditional methods of litigation
are ill-designed to handle such a volume of cases, for their sheer number is inun-
dating the courts"); Ayers, 106 N.J. at 581, 525 A.2d at 299 ("In the absence of
statutory or administrative mechanisms for processing injury claims resulting
from environmental contamination, courts have struggled to accommodate com-
mon-law doctrines to the peculiar characteristics of toxic tort litigation").
76. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 89-272,
90 Stat. § 2795 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982)).
77. RCRA was prospective only in its application and, therefore, is not rele-
vant to any waste disposal problems caused before 1976.
78. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657 (1982)). CERCLA provides comprehensive cleanup liability for
the manufacturers, transporters and disposers of hazardous wastes. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(l)-(4) (1982). This liability includes costs of removal or response in-
curred by the government or any other party and damages to resources caused
by the hazardous waste. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(C).
79. CERCLA did, however, acknowledge the problems in toxic tort litiga-
tion by appointing a study group to examine existing remedies. Section 301(c)
of CERCLA (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e) (1982)) authorized the Study
Group. The group consisted of twelve members, three each from the ALI, the
ABA, the American Association of Trial Lawyers and the American Association
of Attorneys General. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e) (1982).
The Study Group made an extensive critique of the present common law
system as it applied to toxic torts. See SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 22,
Part II. However, none of the Study Group's recommendations were adopted
by Congress. For a discussion of the Study Group's recommendations, see Zaz-
zali & Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights and Remedies? The Report and Recommen-
dations of the Superfund Study Group, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 446, 464-74 (1983).
The Study Group recommended a two-tiered recovery system. Id. at 464. Tier
one consisted of a system similar to workmen's compensation, with certain relax-
ations of proof requirements and a rebuttable presumption of causation. Id. at
464-69. Tier two consisted of a common-law scheme of recovery involving no
proof relaxations, liberal joinder, a discovery rule, and joint and several liability.
Id. at 469-71. The Study Group can, perhaps, be credited with helping prompt
Congress to establish a federally mandated discovery rule in toxic waste expo-
450
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B. The Application of the Prerequisites for Recovery for Future Injury to Toxin
Exposure Litigation
One of the most serious problems facing the toxic tort plaintiff and
therefore, one of the most convincing rationales for the enhanced risk
claim, is the inapplicability of the general tort standards for recovery of
future damages to toxic tort litigation. Since future injury resulting
from a toxic tort can be potentially the most devastating injury facing
the exposure victim, 80 compensation for the inchoate harm can there-
fore form a major part of the toxic tort damage award. On the other
hand, if future damages are denied, the plaintiff will go without compen-
sation for a major part of his or her injury. While jurisdictions differ in
their requirements for the recovery of future damages, there are two
basic prerequisites. First, the plaintiff must have suffered some present
injury.8 1 Second, the plaintiff must show that any future damages are
reasonably probable. 82
1. The Present Injury Requirement
The present injury requirement prescribes that the plaintiff show
that he or she is presently suffering from a concrete physical injury.83 In
sure cases. For a discussion of CERCLA's present requirement that state courts
use a discovery rule in hazardous waste litigation, see supra note 46.
80. Asbestos-related injuries present a compelling example. A typical as-
bestos exposure victim first contracts asbestosis or pleural thickening, which are
generally mild diseases caused by asbestos fibers scarring the lungs. Yet, that
person then has approximately a 15 percent chance of later contracting
mesothelioma, an extremely deadly form of cancer. Wilson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 120 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
81. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1965) defines "injury" as
the "invasion of any legally protected interest." Id. § 7(1). As such, this defini-
tion of injury is essentially a legal conclusion. An action will result in an injury if
tort law protects against its consequences. Courts, therefore, are referring to
what the Restatement refers to as "physical harm" when they say "injury." "Physi-
cal harm" is defined as "physical impairment of the human body." Id. § 7(3).
For a discussion of cases applying this requirement, see infra notes 83-97 and
accompanying text.
82. For a discussion of cases on the requirement that future damages be
reasonably certain, see infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
83. See generally Gideon v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136
(5th Cir. 1985) ("While the sale of a defective product creates a potential for
liability, the law grants no cause of action for inchoate wrongs .... [There] is no
cause of action for negligence or products liability until there is 'actual loss or
damage resulting to the interests of another.' " (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON,
supra note 37, § 30, at 165)); Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail),
758 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir.) ("until injury manifests itself, it follows that there
[is] ... no legal relationship between plaintiffs and defendants relevant to plain-
tiffs' future causes of action in tort from which an "interest" could flow"), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713,
719 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (risk of cancer alone without manifestation of physical injury
is insufficient to meet requirements of cause of action for products liability);
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 37, § 35, at 165 (proof of actual suffering or
injury is prerequisite for recovery in negligence).
19881 NOTE
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fact, some courts and commentators assert that no tort has been com-
mitted until there is some such injury.8 4
Some courts have attempted to adapt the present injury require-
ment to the toxic tort context. For example, in Brafford v. Susquehanna
Corp. ,5 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had placed radioactive
substances in and around the foundation of their home before they had
purchased it.86 The plaintiffs contended that, as a result, they suffered
an increased risk of cancer, 87 yet they claimed no present physical injury
beyond cellular and subcellular damage caused by the radiation.
The Brafford court admitted that "it is the law in the 10th Circuit as
well as in other jurisdictions that an increased risk of cancer without an
accompanying present physical injury is insufficient to state a claim for
strict liability."'8 8 However, the court accepted the plaintiffs' contention
that this injury requirement could be satisfied by cellular and subcellular
damage and denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. 89 The
court stated that it was a question of fact whether the cellular and sub-
cellular damage caused by radiation satisfied the prerequisite of a pres-
ent injury.90
Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail)9 1 also involved the ques-
tion of whether injuries similar to cellular and subcellular injuries might
provide a cause of action. In that case, the defendants claimed that
plaintiffs' exposure to asbestos had caused "subclinical" 9 2 injury before
their injuries became manifest.93 Unlike the Brafford court, the United
84. See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 37, § 30, at 165 ("The threat
of future harm, not yet realized, is not enough"). See also Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at
942 ("there is generally no cause of action in tort until a plaintiff has suffered
identifiable, compensable injury").
85. 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984).
86. Id. at 15. Susquehanna was engaged in uranium mining. During ura-
nium ore processing, "mill tailings," which are waste byproducts of the ore and
contain radioactive substances, are produced. The Braffords contended that
Susquehanna had placed these mill tailings around the home which they later
purchased. Id.
87. Id. at 17.
88. Id. Plaintiffs' complaint included actions for negligence, failure to warn
and strict liability. Their claims were for the loss of their home, mental distress
and medical surveillance, as well as enhanced risk of cancer. Id. at 16.
89. Id. at 18. Accord Barth v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 661 F. Supp.
193 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (allegations of injury to immune system, even though not
clinically diagnosible, were sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss in toxic
chemical exposure case).
90. Brafford, 586 F. Supp. at 18. The court was also influenced in denying
the summary judgment claim by the fact that the plaintiffs had to recover all
damages in one action. Id.
91. 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
92. Subclinical injury is defined as "having symptoms so mild as to be un-
noticeable in usual clinical examinations and tests." THE RANDOM HOUSE Dic-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1413 (1966).
93. Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 940. Plaintiffs sued several railroad companies
that had gone bankrupt. The companies claimed that since the injury existed
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States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that this was
not the type of injury contemplated by the injury requirement. The
court stated that "there is generally no cause of action in tort until a
plaintiff has suffered identifiable, compensable injury."'94 Such subclini-
cal injury did not constitute an actual loss that general principles of per-
sonal injury tort law require.9 5 The court stated further that any
resultant damages from a successful claim for subclinical injury would
be speculative and likely to lead to inequitable results.9 6 In short, the
Third Circuit voiced the same concerns that other courts have in analyz-
ing the enhanced risk of cause of action. 9 7
2. The Reasonable Probability Standard
The other threshold requirement for recovery of future damages is
that the plaintiff prove that the damages are reasonably probable. This
standard is generally described as requiring that future injuries be more
probable than not or that there is a more than a fifty percent chance that
injury will occur. 98 Once the plaintiff has introduced evidence establish-
ing that the damages are reasonably probable, he or she may recover
fully for those injuries. 99 Thus, a victim who can demonstrate a fifty-one
percent chance of future injury may be compensated as if the injury was
certain to occur. Conversely, a plaintiff who can prove that he or she has
only a forty-nine percent chance of future damage can, as a matter of
law, receive nothing for his or her future injuries.' 0 0 The fifty-one per-
cent threshold for recovery and all-or-nothing compensation have been
before bankruptcy, any claims against them were discharged in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. Plaintiffs and Conrail, the companies' successor, disputed that claim.
Id.
94. Id. at 942; see also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 37, § 30 at 165. One
of the elements of a cause of action in negligence is described as "actual loss or
damages resulting to the interests of another.... The threat of future harm, not
yet realized, is not enough." Id. Actual loss is also required in strict liability. Id.
95. Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 942. But see Barth v. Firestone Tire and Rubber
Co., 661 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (subclinical injury allegations sufficient
to withstand motion to dismiss).
96. For a discussion of the concerns over the speculative nature of the en-
hanced risk claim, see infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
97. For a discussion of the general concerns over the adoption of the en-
hanced risk cause of action, see infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
98. There is a variety of formulations of this standard. See Hagerty v. L & L
Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986) ("more probable than not");
Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 1985) ("reasonable
medical probability"); Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119
(D.C. Cir. 1982) ("a greater than 50 percent chance"); Askey v. Occidental
Chem. Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130, 136, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (App. Div. 1984) ("a
reasonable certainty . . .[the injuries] will result").
99. Wilson v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 n.44 (D.C. Cir.
1982) ("This 'all or nothing' approach is the traditional rule.").
100. See, e.g., Id., at 119 (plaintiff must show more than 50% chance that
future injury will later occur, otherwise plaintiff is limited to recovery for harm
that is already manifest). In addition, res judicata may bar a subsequent suit
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roundly criticized by the advocates of enhanced risk.' 0 ' This scheme is
characterized as arbitrary and unfair in that it allows or denies recovery
based upon the ability of a plaintiff to meet certain evidentiary require-
ments where those requirements have no real medical significance. 10 2
Thus, most jurisdictions seem to require that there be an existing
physical injury and that future injury be reasonably certain.10 3 Other-
wise, courts seem to regard the likelihood of future injury as too specu-
lative to allow recovery. 10 4 Some courts, on the other hand, have
allowed recovery in the absence of evidence that the future complica-
tions from an injury are reasonably certain. In Feist v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 10 5 for example, the plaintiff suffered a skull fracture when defend-
ant's cash register fell and struck him. 10 6 Medical testimony indicated
that, as a result of the fracture, plaintiff suffered an increased risk of
contracting meningitis,' 0 7 although the risk was not quantified as being
more than fifty percent. Rather, testimony indicated that the plaintiff
probably was susceptible to meningitis.10 8 The Oregon Supreme Court,
in allowing an award under such circumstances, stated that, "as a matter
of common sense .. . a jury can properly make a larger award of dam-
ages in a case involving a skull fracture of such a nature as to result in a
susceptibility of meningitis than in a case" without such a risk. 10 9 The
court still relied upon the "reasonably probable" standard. Yet, it found
that the plaintiff satisfied the standard since testimony at trial demon-
strated that it was reasonably probable that there was a risk of or suscep-
should the 49% or less chance materialize. For a discussion of the effect of res
judicata on toxic tort plaintiffs, see supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
101. "This arbitrary result fails to recognize the scientific certainty of quan-
titative risk assessment. It unjustly denies immediate relief to everyone in the
exposed population for their increased risk .... " Comment, Increased Risk of
Disease, supra note 29, at 639. See also Gale & Goyer, supra note 74, at 743 (medi-
cal testimony that plaintiff has 49% chance of contracting cancer is as reliable as
that which establishes that he or she has 51% chance of disease).
102. See Seltzer, supra note 29, at 815-25 (medical and legal causation con-
cepts ultimately antagonistic in that medical causation is inherently uncertain).
103. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir.
1986); Brafford, 586 F. Supp. at 17-18.
104. "Recovery of damages for speculative or conjectural future conse-
quences is not permitted. To meet the 'reasonably certain' standard, courts
have generally required plaintiffs to prove that it is more likely than not ... that
the projected consequence will occur." Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The trial court in Ayers voiced similar con-
cerns. "To permit recovery for possible risk of injury or sickness raises the spec-
tre of potential claims arising out of tortious conduct increasing in boundless
proportion." Ayers, 189 N.J. Super. at 568, 461 A.2d at 187.
105. 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675 (1973).
106. Id. at 403, 517 P.2d at 675.
107. Id. at 404-05, 517 P.2d at 676. Medical testimony indicated that the
tear of the skull or brain lining that accompanied the skull fracture increased the
plaintiff's chance of contracting meningitis, an infection inside the lining. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 412, 517 P.2d at 680.
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tibility to future harm.°10 Under such a formulation, the Ayers plaintiffs
would be allowed to recover for their enhanced risk of disease, as expert
testimony had established that the Legler area residents had certainly
suffered an enhanced risk of cancer.I1 1 Few courts, however, have al-
lowed recovery under such circumstances.
The basic tort prerequisites for future damage place the toxic tort
plaintiff at a serious disadvantage. Some exposure victims suffer some
present harm, yet future injuries, many of which can be serious, cannot
be quantified as being probable. Other victims do not suffer any present
injuries, yet are able to show that future damages are very likely. Under
either of these circumstances, most jurisdictions would bar any present
award for future injury. Res judicata and the statute of limitations may
prohibit a subsequent suit. 1 12 In addition, the passage of time between
exposure and manifestation of disease may gravely reduce the victim's
chances of recovery.11 3 Thus, many see enhanced risk as a solution to
some of the toxic plaintiff's formidable difficulties.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Enhanced Risk. The Nature of the Cause of Action
There are essentially two distinct and conceptually different ways to
view the enhanced risk cause of action. The first is that it is a present
award for future injury. 114 Under this view, an award for enhanced risk
would be for damages that may occur in the future, discounted by the
chance that the injuries will not, in fact, develop. If conceptualized this
way, recovery for enhanced risk is only possible in jurisdictions without
110. Id. at 413, 517 P.22d at 680. For other cases allowing recovery for an
enhanced susceptibility to future disease or injury, see Martin v. City of New
Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1982) (risk of injuries from bullet wound com-
pensable even though not "reasonably probable"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203
(1983); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 672 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986)
(increased risk of liver and kidney disease and cancer from chemical waste expo-
sure); Davis v. Garviss, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984) (likelihood of future compli-
cations from vehicle collision and related emotional distress were compensable).
111. Plaintiffs' expert witness testified that "virtually all plaintiffs were at
significant and substantial increased risk of developing cancer." Ayers, 202 N.J.
Super. at 121, 493 A.2d at 1322.
112. For discussion of resjudicata and statute of limitations problems, see
supra notes 43-47 & 52-67 and accompanying text.
113. For a discussion of the barriers to recovery that may arise between
exposure and manifestation of disease, see supra notes 32-86 and accompanying
text.
114. This is the view of the enhanced risk claim that most courts take. See
Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 82 (3d Cir. 1986) (viewing risk as
injury is "fundamentally at odds with" New Jersey law). For cases viewing en-
hanced risk as a present award of future damages and, therefore, declaring that
such damages are too speculative, see infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
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a present injury requirement 1 5 or in those that would be willing to sus-
pend that requirement in toxin exposure litigation. Since this future
damages characterization of the enhanced risk claim necessarily assumes
that there is no present injury from the corresponding risk, ajurisdiction
that requires a present injury is likely to reject the enhanced risk claim
out of hand.
Another view of the enhanced risk cause of action is to characterize
the risk itself as an injury. 16 This view of the claim suggests that a risk
of future injury caused by a defendant's wrongful act is an extant injury
which tort law should both recognize and compensate.17 Thus, the en-
hanced risk claim, if viewed as a present injury, does not depend on the
actual occurrence of injury to justify a damage award. Rather, it would
be appropriate to compensate the victim for the risk in and of itself.
B. Enhanced Risk: The Elements of a Cause of Action
An enhanced risk cause of action would consist of several ele-
ments. 1 18 First, the plaintiff would have to show that he or she was ex-
posed to the hazardous waste." 9 Then the plaintiff must demonstrate
that exposure to the waste caused an increased risk of disease or other
injury. 120 Finally, the plaintiff must show the extent of the increased
risk. The trier of fact then would determine the appropriate compensa-
tion based, not upon actual injury, but rather on the increased risk.' 2 '
115. For a discussion of the physical injury requirement and cases dealing
with it, see supra, notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
116. This view is favored by many of the proponents of the enhanced risk
cause of action. It was advanced by the plaintiff in Herber, but rejected by the
court. Herber Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 82 (3d Cir. 1986). Several
commentators have also taken this position. See, e.g., Note, Increased Risk of Can-
cer, supra note 74, at 589 (application of present injury requirement to enhanced
risk claim is inappropriate; injury is risk of disease itself). This view is popular
with plaintiffs and advocates of the enhanced risk cause of action because it satis-
fies the present injury requirement, thus squeezing the enhanced risk claim into
one of the legal pidgeonholes necessary for recovery.
117. This concept of enhanced risk would be in concert with the Restatement
of Torts, since the Restatement refers to injury as the "invasion of any legally pro-
tected interest" rather than as actual damage. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 7 (1985). However, courts generally refer to actual damage when they
use the word injury, despite the Restatement formulation. For a discussion of this
issue, see supra note 81.
118. For a discussion of enhanced risk as a cause of action, see Rosenberg,
supra note 30, at 859-87; Seltzer, supra note 29, at 833-41, 848-52 Comment,
Increased Risk of Disease, supra note 29, at 643-48; Note, Increased Risk of Cancer,
supra note 61, at 586-92.
119. Seltzer, supra note 29, at 848. The plaintiff must show that he or she
"was or is exposed to a hazardous waste substance or substances." Id.
120. Id.
121. Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 859. The "central component" of an en-
hanced risk claim would be a "standard of proportional liability" under which
"courts would impose liability and distribute compensation in proportion to the
probability of causation assigned to the excess risk of disease in the exposed
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Presumably, the cause of action would accrue when the exposure cre-
ated any risk that would be identifiable and quantifiable. In jurisdictions
that have some form of a discovery rule, that accrual would be delayed
until the plaintiff is in a position to know of this increased risk.' 2 2
There are several methods that exposure victims can use to show
that, as a result of their exposure, they are subject to an increased risk of
disease. 123 Perhaps the plaintiffs' most important tool is the use of epi-
demiological studies and experts. Epidemiologists 124 use statistics de-
rived from comparing exposures to certain substances and occurrence
of disease in exposed populations in order to establish the toxicity of the
substance and the causes of diseases. 125 In many cases, an epidemiolo-
gist is able to describe, in percentages, the increased risk of disease re-
sulting from exposure to a certain amount of a toxin. As a result,
epidemiology can establish both the existence of an increased risk and
quantify, within a fairly narrow range, such an increase.126 Epidemiolo-
gists often have difficulty, however, making exact percentage estimates
of the enhanced risk of disease. 12 7 In such cases, the risk can be estab-
lished by offering expert testimony to approximate the risk. Additional
evidence as to the duration, frequency, and intensity of exposure may
assist the trier of fact in determining the extent of the risk.'
2 8
population." Id.; Comment, Increased Risk of Disease, supra note 29, at 649.
"Under the proportional recovery approach, the court fixes the percentage of
future damages to be awarded by the probability of disease formation." Rosen-
berg, supra note 30, at 859.
122. For a discussion of the application of such discovery rules, see supra
notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
123. See generally M. DORE, supra note 24, §§ 24-27.
124. "Epidemiology is the only generally accepted scientific discipline that
deals with the integrated use of statistics and biological/medical science to iden-
tify and establish the causes of human diseases." Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic
Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 736 (1984).
125. Id.
126. See Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 694 (1988).
The plaintiffs in Allen claimed injuries resulting from radioactive fallout from
nuclear weapons testing from 1951 to 1963. 588 F. Supp. at 257-58. The Allen
court recognized that epidemiological studies could help quantify the chances
that future injuries would occur from exposure to injurious substances. Id. at
416-18. Plaintiffs often use epidemiological studies to establish that these
chances are beyond the "reasonable medical certainty" threshold required for
recovery of future damages. For a discussion of the requirement that future
damages be shown to be reasonably probable, see supra notes 98-111 and ac-
companying text.
127. The expert who testified on behalf of the Ayers plaintiffs stated that it
was impossible to quantify the degree of the increase of risk. Ayers, 202 N.J.
Super. at 125, 493 A.2d at 1324. Moreover, many courts are sometimes reluc-
tant to admit statistical evidence of increased risk due to the inability of science
to quantify the risk. Gale & Goyer, supra note 74, at 744.
128. See Seltzer, supra note 29, at 848. This commentator recommends us-
ing this evidence along with medical testimony that exposure caused a "reason-
able medical concern" that there would be future injury. Id. at 849.
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Once the risk has been established, the trier of fact would then de-
termine the appropriate compensation. The award for the inchoate in-
jury would be proportional to the risk of its occurrence. Thus, if the
trier of fact were to find that the risk was twenty-five percent, it would
award the plaintiff twenty-five percent of the full compensation for the
injury. 129
C. Related Causes of Action: Medical Surveillance and Emotional Ditress
Other claims commonly result from situations in which plaintiffs
seek recovery for enhanced risk of disease. Claims for medical surveil-
lance and emotional distress or "cancerphobia"' 30 are two such addi-
tional, distinct causes of action that are often appended to enhanced risk
claims. 13 1 The two are logical outgrowths of enhanced risk, as they
compensate victims for results of exposure to toxins without regard to
whether the victims have in fact contracted disease. Yet the claims for
medical surveillance and emotional distress are not contingent on a rec-
ognition of the enhanced risk claim, as they address concerns independ-
ent of the actual development of disease.' 3 2
An award for medical surveillance seeks to compensate exposure
victims for medical expenses necessitated by the exposure. Plaintiffs as-
sert that those who are subjected to an increased risk of disease, particu-
larly a serious one such as cancer, need more frequent medical
examinations than those without such an increased risk, since early de-
tection can greatly improve the chances that a person who actually de-
129. Therefore, if the jury were to find that appropriate compensation for
the injury was $100,000 and the risk of injury was 25 percent, it would award the
plaintiff $25,000 for the enhanced risk claim.
130. Some courts and commentators refer to the emotional distress result-
ing from exposure to carcinogens as fear of cancer or "cancerphobia." See Gale
& Goyer, supra note 74, at 724. As that article points out, however, technically,
phobias are unfounded fears; therefore, the term "cancerphobia" can be mis-
leading since courts only allow recovery where there is some reasonable basis
for the emotional distress. Id. at 724-25. Nevertheless, the term has rather wide
usage.
131. Enhanced risk claims are generally accompanied by claims for medical
surveillance and emotional distress. See, e.g., Deleski v. Raymark Indus., Inc.,
819 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1987) (enhanced risk and emotional distress both claimed
and both denied); Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986)
(all three theories of recovery claimed; enhanced risk denied while medical sur-
veillance and emotional distress allowed); Johnson v. Armstrong Cork Co.. 645
F. Supp. 764 (W.D. La. 1986) (all three theories claimed; only enhanced risk
denied); DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 154 Ariz. 604, 744 P.2d 705 (Ariz. App.
1987) (all three theories claimed; all three denied); Eagle-Picher, 481 So. 2d at
517 (all three theories claimed, only enhanced risk denied); Ayers, 106 N.J. at
565-66, 525 A.2d at 291 (all three claimed, medical surveillance allowed, en-
hanced risk denied, and emotional distress precluded by sovereign immunity).
132. Indeed, most cases that have denied the enhanced risk cause of action
have allowed claims for either medical surveillance, emotional distress, or both.
For examples of cases allowing these claims, see supra note 131.
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velops the disease will survive.13 3 If this element of damage is not
recoverable against a tortfeasor, the exposure victim may go uncompen-
sated for real, out-of-pocket expenses caused by the defendant's wrong-
ful acts. 134
Yet courts have expressed some reluctance to accept the medical
surveillance claim. Since the ultimate development of disease is specula-
tive, especially where the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that its onset
is a reasonable probability, 13 5 the validity of the medical surveillance
claim can also be brought into question. 136 Moreover, there may be
some concern that plaintiffs would not actually use such an award for
medical surveillance. ' 3 7
Another claim is for emotional distress occasioned by the exposure.
This claim seeks to redress the fear, anxiety and worry that would pre-
sumably accompany the exposure victim's knowledge that he or she has
a risk of disease.13 8 Recovery for this claim is generally contingent on
whether the plaintiff can satisfy the general tort requirements for the
recovery of emotional distress damages.' 39
133. In Ayers, plaintiffs' medical expert testified at trial that the residents of
the area needed annual medical exams in order to detect development of disease
as early as possible. Ayers, 106 NJ. at 599, 525 A.2d at 292.
134. In Ayers, for example, over half the jury's award, or more than $8.2
million, was for medical surveillance; the jury only awarded about $5.2 million
to compensate the plaintiffs for being without running water for two years. Id. at
565-66, 525 A.2d at 291. Such a result suggests that the Ayers jury saw the medi-
cal surveillance damages as the most significant in the case.
135. For a discussion of the requirement that future damages be reasonably
probable, see supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
136. The appellate division in Ayers apparently held this view. That court
stated that since plaintiffs could not quantify their increased risk, it was unjust to
impose "upon the defendant the burden of lifetime medical surveillance for
early clinical signs of cancer." Ayers, 202 N.J. Super. at 122, 493 A.2d at 1323.
For a discussion of the appellate division's holding inAyers, see supra notes 12-15
and accompanying text.
137. The New Jersey Supreme Court voiced concern over how the plaintiffs
would in fact use their medical surveillance award and decided that in future
cases courts should use a fund to reimburse plaintiffs for the actual medical costs
that they incur. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 610-11, 525 A.2d at 314-15.
138. For a discussion of the Ayers plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress,
see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
139. There are several different views on the elements of a prima facie case
to recover for emotional distress. Courts may require some injury from the de-
fendant's wrongful acts, some impact upon the plaintiff's body, or neither. See
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 37, § 54, at 361-65. In the enhanced risk con-
text, the effect of the injury requirement is to preclude the emotional distress
claim. See Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir.
1986) (no emotional distress award allowed if plaintiff fails to prove injury);
DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 154 Ariz. 604, -, 744 P.2d 705, 709 (Ariz. App.
1987) (allowing inhalation of asbestos fibers to satisfy injury requirement "goes
beyond the reach of current Arizona law"). Cf. Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985) (while Texas law requires injury
before emotional distress is recoverable, once injury exists, award for emotional
1988] 459NOTE
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D. The Reaction of the Courts to Enhanced Risk
Although many commentators have urged that courts recognize the
enhanced risk cause of action, 140 it has been uniformly rejected by
courts who have considered it.141 In rare cases, plaintiffs have been al-
lowed to recover for an enhanced risk of injury where they had a pre-
existing injury and future injuries were potentially traumatic. 14 2
Some courts have rejected enhanced risk because of the inherently
speculative nature of any resultant damages. 14 3 Courts have been ex-
tremely reluctant to allow compensation for injuries which may never
occur. Furthermore, thousands and perhaps millions of people are ex-
posed to injurious substances every day. Courts apparently fear that if
plaintiffs are allowed to recover for the risks created by our society, a
legion of speculative, spurious lawsuits would result. 144 Other courts
see the enhanced risk claim as simply being unjust. These courts assert
that such a claim would either overcompensate exposure victims who do
not ultimately contract the disease or undercompensate those who
do.14 5 Those who become ill will have been awarded only a fraction of
distress is not limited to concerns over present injury, but may include distress
over risk of future harm).
In jurisdictions requiring an impact on the plaintiff's body, the requisite
impact is generally minimal. Thus, courts have held that the "impact" of a toxin
on a plaintiff's body is sufficient to allow recovery for emotional distress. See,
e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1986) (impact
requirement under New Jersey law satisfied by plaintiff's pleural thickening due
to asbestos exposure); Eagle-Picher, 481 So. 2d at 526-27 (Florida impact require-
ment satisfied by inhalation of asbestos fibers).
In jurisdictions where there is no physical impact or injury requirement, the
absence of injury in a toxin exposure context would not be an issue in the recov-
ery of damages for emotional distress. It is interesting to note that while the
Herber court seemed concerned about New Jersey's impact requirement, the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Ayers seemed to assume that New Jersey no longer had
such a requirement. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 574, 525 A.2d at 295 ("our cases no
longer require proof of causally-related impact to sustain a recovery for emo-
tional distress").
140. For a list of commentators advocating an enhanced risk claim, see
supra note 74 and accompanying text.
141. For cases rejecting an enhanced risk claim, see supra note 131 & infra
note 178.
142. For a discussion of cases accepting enhanced risk-like claims under
these circumstances, see supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
143. See Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 942 (court feared that if enhanced risk claim
were recognized "countless seemingly healthy railroad workers, workers who
might never manifest injury, would have tort claims cognizable in federal
court."); Ayers, 189 N.J. Super. at 568, 461 A.2d at 187 (trial court apprehensive
of speculative damages resulting from such claim).
144. For a discussion of the reasonably probable standard for the recovery
of future injuries and why the courts believe it is necessary, see supra notes, 98-
111 and accompanying text.
145. See Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986);
Eagle-Picher, 481 So. 2d at 524. The Anderson court noted that "[t]o award dam-
ages based on a mere mathematical probability would significantly undercom-
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what they deserve, while those who do not in fact contract disease will
have been compensated for injuries that never materialize. These two
results are inevitable under the enhanced risk claim. Neither result is
acceptable to many courts' sense of fairness. 14 6
Courts also see enhanced risk as unfair in that the trier of fact is
unable to accurately assess damages on which to base the proportional
recovery. 14 7 Evidence of the consequences of future disease is likely to
be scant at best. Arguably, the consequences of a disease can be gauged
and compensated only after it has become manifest. This criticism, how-
ever, can be leveled at any award of damages for prospective harm,
whether they meet the reasonably probable standard and have an ante-
cedent injury or not.
Toxin exposure litigation, therefore, presents courts with two ap-
parently unacceptable alternatives. The first involves clinging to the
traditional tort damage requirements in toxic tort cases. Under this al-
ternative, many plaintiffs would go undercompensated. 148 Second,
courts could accept the enhanced risk cause of action and allow propor-
tional recovery for inchoate injury. Yet, the speculative nature of the
enhanced risk claim and aspects of proportional recovery have proven to
be unacceptable to those courts that have addressed the issue.1 4 9 In this
context, the New Jersey Supreme Court has worked out what may be an
acceptable, feasible, and just alternative. 150
E. The Ayers Response
The compromise solution at which the New Jersey Supreme Court
arrived comprised of several elements. First, the court held that the
statute of limitations would not bar a subsequent suit if disease did, in
fact, later materialize.' 5 1 The court stated that "[t]he bar of the statute
pensate those who actually do develop cancer and would be a windfall to those
who do not." Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1232 (citing Arnett v. Dow Chem. Corp.,
no. 729-586, slip op. at 15 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 1983)).
146. This criticism is appropriate only if the enhanced risk claim is charac-
terized as a present award for future injury. If seen as compensation for a pres-
ent injury, i.e. if the risk itself is seen as an injury, then over or
undercompensation would not be an issue, as the fairness of the award does not
depend upon the ultimate development of injury. For a discussion of the view of
enhanced risk that the risk itself is an injury, see supra notes 116-17 and accom-
panying text.
147. Eagle-Picher, 481 So. 2d at 524.
148. For a further discussion of the various obstacles to recovery facing the
toxic tort plaintiff, see supra notes 32-113 and accompanying text.
149. For a discussion of cases rejecting enhanced risk as a cause of action,
see supra note 131 and infra note 178.
150. The court noted the dilemma it faced: "Our disposition of this diffi-
cult and important issue requires that we choose between two alternatives, each
having a potential for imposing unfair and undesirable consequences on the af-
fected interests." Ayers, 106 NJ. at 597, 525 A.2d at 307.
151. Id. at 584, 525 A.2d at 300.
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of limitations is avoided because, under New Jersey's discovery rule, the
cause of action does not accrue until the victim is aware of the injury or
disease and of the facts indicating that a third party is or may be respon-
sible." 15 2 The Ayers court also held that resjudicata would not bar a sub-
sequent suit if injuries later occurred.153 The court found the principles
behind the "single controversy rule," or res judicata 154 inapplicable in
the toxic tort context.
The court, therefore, held that the plaintiffs' cause of action for per-
sonal injuries would accrue when the latent disease manifests itself, even
if there were a previous award based on the consequences of toxic expo-
sure. 155 The court made it clear that if an exposure victim receives com-
pensation for property damage and future medical expenses or other
injuries, 156 the statute of limitations and the single controversy rule' 5 7
would not prohibit a subsequent suit for personal injuries.15 8 Since the
plaintiffs' cause of action for personal injuries did not exist until the in-
152. Id. at 583, 525 A.2d at 300.
153. For a discussion of the Ayers court's holding on the resjudicata issue,
see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of the application of the single controversy rule in
New Jersey, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
155. Id. Other courts have held that the statute of limitations is not a bar if
the plaintiff has suffered some injury and has "discovered" it for purposes of the
discovery rule, yet has not sued for damages. Under these circumstances, these
courts have held that a later action is not precluded by the statute of limitations
if an exposure victim subsequently contracts further disease resulting from ex-
posure. See Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 120-21 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 668, 464 A.2d
1020, 1028 (1983) (both Wilson and Pierce holding that prior discovery of asbes-
tosis does not bar action for damages due to the manifestation of cancer, as
plaintiff had not instituted suit for asbestosis); Goodman v. Mead Johnson &
Co., 534 F.2d 566, 574-75 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding, under New Jersey law, sum-
mary judgment improper since genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether plaintiff knew of possible cause of action for cancer and thrombophlebi-
tis from use of contraceptive despite plaintiff having consulted an attorney about
possible suit after manifestation of thrombophlebitis), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977). The Ayers court held, however, that the statute of limitations is not a bar
even though plaintiffs had recovered for medical surveillance and decreased
quality of life. But see Place v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1009,
1012 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (plaintiff who had previous injuries from use of IUD was
not entitled to new cause of action for every subsequent injury that occurred).
For a further discussion, see supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
156. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 583, 525 A.2d at 300.
157. For a discussion of the relationship between resjudicata and the single
controversy rule, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
158. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 584, 525 A.2d at 300. The court stated that the stat-
ute of limitations would not bar a subsequent suit since, under New Jersey's
discovery rule, the statute does not begin to run until after the manifestation of
disease. Id. at 583, 525 A.2d at 300. Moreover, the court stated that the single
controversy rule would not impede recovery if disease later developed. The
court stated that the rule "cannot sensibly be applied to a toxic-tort claim filed
when disease is manifested years after exposure, merely because the same plain-
tiff sued previously to recover for property damage or other injuries." Id.
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juries became manifest, the court reasoned, these rules were inapplif-a-
ble. 159 The claims could not be split as they simply did not exist.1
6 0
The Ayers court has thus joined a minority of jurisdictions that have
expressly adapted res judicata concepts to the special characteristics of
toxic tort litigation. 16 1 By preserving the exposure victim's cause of ac-
tion, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision has the potential to sig-
nificantly expand plaintiffs' rights in toxic tort suits.
The New Jersey Supreme Court also held that the Ayers plaintiffs
were entitled to compensation for medical surveillance expenses made
necessary by their exposure. 162 The appellate division had stated that
since the plaintiffs could not prove with reasonable medical certainty
that disease would occur, the plaintiffs could not recover for either the
risk of disease itself or medical surveillance. 163
The supreme court, however, stated that such an analysis assumed a
nexus between the quantum of proof required for recovery for the risk
of disease and recovery for medical surveillance expenses of those who
faced such a risk. 164 Rather, the court held that such expenses were
recoverable in toxin exposure cases before manifestation of disease
when circumstances made the surveillance "reasonable and neces-
sary."' 16 5 The court outlined several factors in making this determina-
tion. First of all, the award must be based upon reliable expert
testimony. The trier of fact may then consider the toxicity of the chemi-
cals, the nature and seriousness of the diseases involved, the value of
159. Id.
160. As a result, the rights of asbestos plaintiffs have been expanded. In
the typical asbestos case, the plaintiff first develops pleural thickening or asbes-
tosis. Later, cancer may develop. The two diseases are medically unrelated; that
is, cancer does not develop from asbestosis. Rather, it is an additional effect of
exposure to asbestos. Generally, a plaintiff who suffers from tortiously inflicted
injury has a cause of action which accrues when any resulting injury becomes
manifest. Cf. Braxton-Secret v. A.H. Robins Co., 769 F.2d 528, 530-31 (9th Cir.
1985); Miller v. A.H. Robins Co., 766 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 1985) (both
Braxton and Miller holding that cause of action for injuries due to use of defective
contraceptive (IUD) accrued at time of miscarriage, as that event put plaintiffs
on notice as to defect in product). However, some courts have chosen to treat
asbestosis and cancer as separate and distinct injuries, and, therefore, separate
causes of action. See Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 568,
495 A.2d 495, 502 (Law Div. 1985). For a further discussion, see supra notes 58-
67 and accompanying text. The Ayers court, in what is admittedly dicta, seems to
have settled this question in New Jersey.
161. For a discussion of courts that have adapted resjudicata to the toxic tort
context, see supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
162. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 606, 525 A.2d at 302.
163. For a discussion of the appellate division's treatment of the medical
surveillance claim, see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
164. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 599-600, 525 A.2d at 309. "This analysis assumes
that the reasonableness of the medical intervention, and, therefore, its compen-
sability, depends solely on the sufficiency of proof that the occurrence of the
disease is probable." Id.
165. Id. at 606, 525 A.2d at 312.
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early detection of these diseases, the extent of the exposure and the rel-
ative enhancement of risk in deciding whether the expenses are reason-
ably necessary. ' 66
The court found that its recognition of the medical surveillance
claim was consistent with denying the enhanced risk cause of action, as
the claims were distinguishable. 16 7 The former was compensation for
expenses reasonably incurred due to the township's wrongful acts. 16 8
The latter, the court said, was compensation for actual physical injury to
the plaintiffs before such injury actually exists or is shown to be prob-
able.169 One is actual damage. The other is a speculative, anticipatory
award. 170 Furthermore, the court found it "inequitable for an individ-
ual, wrongfully exposed to toxic chemicals but unable to prove that dis-
ease is likely, to have to pay his own expenses when medical intervention
is clearly reasonable and necessary."' 71
In allowing the claim for medical surveillance, the Ayers court noted
that the issues in the case would be recurring.17 2 Thus, while the court
permitted the township residents to retain the individual amounts
awarded to them at trial, it asserted that in the future trial courts should
set up a fund to administer medical surveillance payments. 17 3 Such a
fund would serve several purposes. First, it insures that plaintiffs actu-
ally use the surveillance damages for the reason they were awarded, i.e.,
for medical surveillance. It thus encourages the plaintiffs to keep track
of their health.174 Also, a fund mechanism, "limit[s] the liability of de-
fendants to the amount of expenses actually incurred."' 175 The court
noted that the fund would be particularly appropriate in suits against
166. Id.
167. Id. at 606, 525 A.2d at 312-13.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 606, 525 A.2d at 313.
171. Id. at 604-05, 525 A.2d at 312. Furthermore, the court found author-
ity in other jurisdictions to support an award for medical surveillance. See Hag-
erty v. L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 319-20 (5th Cir. 1986) (allowing claim
for medical surveillance while denying claim for enhanced risk of contracting
cancer); Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816,
824-25 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (allowing claims for diagnostic exams for injuries caused
by defendant's defective aircraft absent present physical injury). But see Hendrix
v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1507 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (holding,
under Georgia law, that future medical expenses, like all other damages, must be
proven with reasonable certainty and denying plaintiff's claim, which was unsup-
ported by any evidence).
172. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 579, 525 A.2d at 298. "At the outset, we must recog-
nize that the issues presented by this case and others like it will be recurring."
Id.
173. Id. at 608, 525 A.2d at 314. "In our view, the use of a court-supervised
fund to administer medical surveillance payments in mass exposure cases ... is a
highly appropriate exercise of the Court's equitable powers." Id.
174. Id. at 609, 525 A.2d at 314.
175. Id.
464 [Vol. 33: p. 437
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss2/6
public entities, as the state legislature had intended to limit their tort
liability by passing the Tort Claims Act.' 76
IV. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that, considering all the issues raised by the Ayers
case, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Ayers fashioned a workable deci-
sion from the toxic tort/enhanced risk dilemma. It has taken a moderate
position between the two extremes of traditional tort principles and the
enhanced risk advocates. No one may be entirely satisfied with the
court's resolution of these issues, yet perhaps it found what will prove to
be a practical solution.
The view that enhanced risk is an inequitable claim 17 7 is, to a cer-
tain extent, accurate. An exposure victim who recovers damages for en-
hanced risk will either be overcompensated if he or she does not
contract disease or undercompensated if the disease does materialize.
There can be no truly accurate measure such that damages are commen-
surate with injury. While advocates of the enhanced risk claim may cor-
rectly assert that the present system works some injustice, under the
enhanced risk theory this injustice would be inevitable.
In rejecting the Legler area residents' claim for enhanced risk, the
New Jersey Supreme Court joined a number of jurisdictions that have
recently considered the issue. 178 The Brafford court found it unneces-
sary to either accept or reject enhanced risk, as such, in order to com-
pensate for future disease. 179 Rather, that court merely accepted the
proposition that the subcellular injury which caused the risk was a suffi-
cient present injury to allow for the recovery of present and future dam-
ages. 180 However, it is submitted that this reasoning exalts legal form
176. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-21, comment (West 1982) states that "[iut is
hoped that in utilizing this approach, courts will exercise restraint in the accept-
ance of new and novel causes of action against public entities."
The court found authority in other jurisdictions to support its fund mecha-
nism concept. A federal court used this method in an agent orange suit. See In re
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396, 1402-04 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
177. For a discussion of the view that the enhanced risk claim is inequitable,
see supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
178. See Deleski v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 819 F.2d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1987)(enhanced risk claim for future injuries due to exposure to asbestos not actiona-
ble under either New Jersey or Pennsylvania law); Stites v. Sundstrand Heat
Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1524 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (resident's claim for
enhanced risk of disease caused by chemicals from nearby plant denied); Lavelle
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 507 N.E.2d 476, 478-79, 30 Ohio Misc. 2d
11, 14 (Com. Pl. 1987) (plant worker's enhanced risk claim due to exposure to
asbestos denied). For other cases rejecting enhanced risk, see supra note 131
and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion of the court's holding in Brafford, see supra notes 85-
90 and accompanying text.
180. For a discussion of the Brafford court's holding that subcellular and
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over substance and is tantamount to recognizing the enhanced risk
claim. Any latent disease is caused by a change in genetic material, sub-
cellular structures or subclinical damage. It remains to be seen, how-
ever, whether such damage will ever manifest itself as concrete injury.
Courts should be concerned whether tort law should recognize such a
claim and compensate such injury. They should not focus on whether
they can manipulate the technical legal requirements for recovery in or-
der to reach a particular result.
The Ayers decision has the potential to expand plaintiffs' rights con-
siderably. It has already helped toxic tort plaintiffs in New Jersey by
stating that neither res judicata '8' nor the statute of limitations1 82 will
bar a later suit. The reasoning that underlies this decision is compel-
ling. The New Jersey Supreme Court refused to regard itself as
straightjacketed by precedent; the court recognized that principles of res
judicata and the statute of limitations created more harm for toxic tort
plaintiffs than any benefit derived from them could justify. Therefore,
the court modified these rules in toxic tort cases. While this is a logical
result, the court's holding may nevertheless cause some uncertainty in
application. It may prove difficult to determine exactly when a toxic tort
has occurred, since the term is as broad as it is vague.183 Marginal cases
may arise that will test the limits of the Ayers holding in this regard.
Indeed, it is more logical to relax statute of limitations and resjudi-
cata as restrictions on recovery than to recognize the enhanced risk
claim. Those restrictions are basically procedural tools designed to safe-
guard the orderly administration of justice. Relaxing them under the
correct circumstances is therefore appropriate. 18 4 Allowing recovery
for enhanced risk, however, essentially relaxes the physical injury re-
quirement, 18 5 notwithstanding the fact that one of the main goals of tort
law is the compensation of individuals for the losses that they have actu-
ally suffered. The legal system simply should not formulate doctrines
that allow an uninjured party to recover when there are alternative equi-
table solutions.
Moreover, the Ayers solution is more workable in the context of the
cellular damage may satisfy the present injury requirement, see supra notes 89-
90 and accompanying text.
18 1. For a discussion of the treatment of the res judicata issue in Ayers, see
supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
182. For a discussion of the treatment of the statute of limitations issue in
Ayers, see supra notes 151-52 & 156-160 and accompanying text.
183. For a discussion of the vagueness of the term "toxic tort," see supra
note 24.
184. Eagle-Picher, 481 So. 2d at 517. "[T]o rigidly apply [the rule against
claim splitting] here would do 'violence to the essence and purpose of the gen-
eral rule.' " Id. at 523 (quoting Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105
Cal. App. 3d 316, 326, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591, 596 (1980)).
185. For a discussion of the physical injury requirement, see supra notes 83-
97 and accompanying text.
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tort system's other main goal of deterrence. The total damages paid out
through enhanced risk's proportional compensation system i8 6 should
equal the total paid the plaintiffs if they are allowed to sue after manifes-
tation of disease.' 8 7 Therefore, the aggregate deterrence of enhanced
risk should be the same as the deterrence under Ayers.
As suggested above, it is impossible for the enhanced risk cause of
action to accurately compensate an exposure victim. 18 8 Under Ayers,
however, there is the real chance that a plaintiff will be fully compen-
sated. The plaintiff can recover for property damage, medical surveil-
lance, and, when not suing a public entity,' 8 9 emotional distress.
Therefore, a plaintiff can truly be placed in the same position financially
as he or she was before the exposure to the toxin. As far as a pecuniary
award can compensate for injury, Ayers makes such compensation possi-
ble. Of course, this assumes that a plaintiff can overcome all of the bar-
riers to recovery that exist in a toxic tort case.' 90 Yet, many of the same
barriers would exist in a claim for enhanced risk. 19 1
The Ayers approach is more logical under a cost-benefit analysis as
well. Toxic waste and other toxins are truly an extremely serious prob-
lem.19 2 Yet, we live in an industrialized society and these toxins are a
byproduct of the benefits we receive from such a society. Commentators
seem overanxious to place liability on industry; apparently they are un-
concerned that ultimately it is consumers or, in the case of a suit against
a public entity as in Ayers, taxpayers who will pay for it. Allowing recov-
ery for enhanced risk could truly lead to limitless liability and drive these
186. For a discussion of proportional recovery under enhanced risk, see
supra note 129 and accompanying text.
187. To illustrate this, assume an exposure increases risk of cancer such
that twenty-five percent of the exposed population would get cancer. Under en-
hanced risk, each member of the population would get twenty-five percent of the
full compensation for cancer. Under Ayers, the twenty-five percent of the popu-
lation who did indeed get cancer could recover fully. Theoretically, these two
sums will be the same.
188. For a discussion of the nature of enhanced risk recovery and how it
must either over or undercompensate exposure victims, see supra notes 145-46
and accompanying text.
189. The Tort Claims Act has a limitation on damages for pain and suffer-
ing, supra notes 14-15, that applies only to suits against public entities.
190. For a discussion of the barriers to recovery facing the toxic tort plain-
tiff, see supra note 32-79 and accompanying text.
191. The enhanced risk claim would eliminate many of the problems that
the toxic tort plaintiff faces due to the long latency period between exposure to
the toxin and manifestation of disease. Other barriers to recovery, such as prov-
ing negligence, would still exist. For a discussion of the barriers to recovery in
toxic tort litigation, see supra notes 32-79 and accompanying text. Indeed, as
one of the greatest problems in toxic tort litigation is that the plaintiff is ignorant
of his or her danger until manifestation of disease, it is difficult to see what
assistance the claim would be for many exposure victims.
192. For a discussion of the scope of the toxic waste problem, see supra
notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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valuable industries out of existence. While society should not tolerate
industry and economic growth regardless of the cost, legal theorists
should not espouse new and ingenious causes of action without address-
ing all of the possible ramifications of such proposals should they be
adopted.
In sum, Ayers is not a perfect decision, but it is an equitable one.
Many of the obstacles to recovery that plague the toxin exposure victim
remain intact, 19 3 and the Ayers court's fund provisions are somewhat pa-
ternalistic. 19 4 Nevertheless, it is an attempt to find a just compromise
for a problem that is at once tragic and perplexing.
David S. Pegno
193. For a discussion of the obstacles to recovery facing toxic tort plaintiffs,
see supra notes 32-111 and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of the fund provisions in Ayers, see supra notes 173-76
and accompanying text. It is submitted that the Ayers court's decision to estab-
lish a fund for the medical surveillance claims went beyond the proper adminis-
tration ofjustice. While the merits of legislative intrusion into private affairs are
debatable, it is submitted that courts are singularly ill-suited to play the role of
watchdog over what a judge may consider to be "best" for tort claimants.
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